Stable Networks in Homogeneous Societies by Hellmann, Tim & Landwehr, Jakob
Center for
Mathematical Economics
Working Papers 517
August 2014
Stable Networks in Homogeneous Societies
Tim Hellmann and Jakob Landwehr
Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Bielefeld University
Universita¨tsstraße 25
D-33615 Bielefeld · Germany
e-mail: imw@uni-bielefeld.de
http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/wp/
ISSN: 0931-6558
Stable Networks in Homogeneous
Societies
Tim Hellmann∗ and Jakob Landwehr†
August 7, 2014
We study the structure of pairwise stable networks from a very
general point. Rather than assuming a particular functional form of
utility, we simply assume that the society is homogeneous, i.e. that
agents’ utilities differ only with respect to their network position while
their names do not matter. Existence of certain stable network struc-
tures is then implied by fairly general assumptions on externalities
between links. Depending on the form of link externalities, either the
empty or complete network are always pairwise stable, stable sym-
metric networks exist, or stable networks with a connected subgroup
exist. If the society becomes more homogeneous, then it is possible
to characterize the set of all pairwise stable networks: they are nested
split graphs (NSG). We illustrate these results with many examples
from the literature, including utility profiles that depend on centrality
measures such as Bonacich centrality. In particular, for low discount
factors every pairwise stable network is an NSG if utility is given by
Bonacich centrality.
Keywords: Network Formation, Pairwise Stability, Existence, Homogeneity, Con-
vexity, Strategic Complements, Bonacich Centrality
JEL-Classification: A14, C72, D85.
∗Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, postbox 100131, D-33501 Bielefeld,
Germany. Email: tim.hellmann@uni-bielefeld.de, phone: +49 521 106 2573, fax: +49 521
106 2997.
†Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, postbox 100131, D-33501 Bielefeld,
Germany. Email: jakob.landwehr@uni-bielefeld.de, phone: +49 521 106 4918
1
1 Introduction
Starting with the seminal contribution of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), a sub-
stantial literature has evolved modeling strategic network formation. Economic
agents in these models have a preference ordering over the set of networks. Exam-
ples include firms’ profit when forming R&D networks (Goyal and Joshi, 2003),
countries’ social welfare when forming trade agreements (Goyal and Joshi, 2006a),
and individuals’ importance when forming friendships (Jackson and Wolinsky,
1996). Since the structure of interaction, i.e. the social network, affects every-
days economic outcomes, it is interesting to economists which kind of interaction
structures emerge when links are formed strategically. The seminal concept of
such equilibrium outcomes is the notion of pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolin-
sky, 1996). A central question is then under which conditions stable networks
exist and which structure they have.
In this paper, we approach this question from a very general point. Rather than
assuming a particular functional form of utility, we simply assume a homogeneous
society where each agent’s utility depends only on her network position but not
on her name. We then show that some ordinal link externality conditions on the
utility function are sufficient for the existence of stable networks of particular
architecture. These ordinal link externality conditions define solely the impact
that new links have on incentives to form own links, like ordinal convexity, i.e.
ordinal increasing returns in own links, and ordinal strategic complements, i.e.
ordinal increasing incentives to form own links in other agents’ links. We show
that if one of these link externalities on marginal utility is positive then pairwise
stable networks of certain structure exists. Which class of networks arise as stable
depends on which externality property is satisfied (see Propositions 1, 3, and 4).
While these link externality properties guarantee existence, they are not sufficient
to characterize classes of networks which contain all pairwise stable networks. To
achieve that, we impose stronger assumptions on the homogeneity of the society
in combination with the link externality properties. These stronger conditions
are expressing a general desire to be central in the network which is commonly
observed in network formation models starting with Jackson andWolinsky (1996).
We show that with these stronger notions of positive link externalities all pairwise
stable networks are contained in the class of nested split graphs (Proposition 2).
Nested split graphs (Cvetkovic´ and Rowlinson, 1990) are networks where the
set of neighbors of any two players can be ordered according to the set inclusion
ordering. As the society becomes more and more homogeneous, then the pairwise
stable networks are only found in subclasses of the nested split graphs, the so
called dominant group networks (Propositions 5 and 6).
We illustrate our general results with respect to several important applications.
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Among those is a model of network formation such that the utility of players
is given by their Bonacich centrality (Bonacich, 1987). Such a utility function
arises e.g. when individuals form costly links in the first stage and then engage in
team production in the second stage. Indeed, Ballester et al. (2006) show that the
unique pure strategy equilibrium of the second stage in such a game is determined
by the Bonacich centrality. This measure of centrality counts the number of paths
emanating from a given node which are discounted by the length of each path with
a common discount factor. Utility functions given by Bonacich centrality give rise
to the positive link externalities and, even more interestingly, for small discount
factors, also our stronger link externality properties are satisfied. Hence applying
our general results to utility given by Bonacich centrality, we can conclude that
either the empty network or the complete network are necessarily pairwise stable
(for any discount factor), while any pairwise stable network is of nested split
structure, respectively dominant group structure if the discount factor is small
enough.
General properties of stable networks are of high interest for several reasons. Our
results may help characterize stable networks for future (maybe very complex)
models of network formation, and they provide reasoning why certain stability
structures emerge in existing models of network formation: the driving force
are the link externality conditions. That our results are applicable to so many
settings is due to the generality our approach and the fact that the assumption of
a homogeneous society is not restrictive as almost all models of strategic network
formation share this property (cf. e.g. several surveys and textbooks including
Jackson, 2003, 2006; Goyal, 2005, 2007; Vega-Redondo, 2007; Jackson, 2008; Easly
and Kleinberg, 2010; Hellmann and Staudigl, 2014).
Although the literature on strategic network formation is enormous, only few
results concerning these general structural properties can be found. Exceptions
are Jackson and Watts (2001) and Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007) who use the
restrictive assumption of a potential function (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) to
prove existence of stable networks, and the recent paper Hellmann (2013) who –
similar to our approach – uses link externality conditions to show existence and
uniqueness of stable networks. In light of their general approach, these papers,
however, are not able to show existence of particular stable networks. We fill this
gap with the help of the homogeneity assumption.
Assuming more structure on the functional form of utility, Goyal and Joshi
(2006b) are also able to show existence of particular stable network structures
such as regular networks, dominant group structures, and exclusive group struc-
tures depending on cardinal link externalities.1 They, however, assume a specific
form of utility depending only on a particular network statistic, the vector of
1Regular networks are such that all nodes have the same number of neighbors (degree), while
we refer the reader to Goyal and Joshi (2006b) for a definition of exclusive group structures.
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agents’ degrees. We show that some of their results can be generalized in two
ways: first, they hold for arbitrary utility functions in a homogeneous society;
second, the link externality conditions can be generalized to hold also in ordinal
terms. Thereby, our results are applicable to many examples of utility which
are not captured in the framework of Goyal and Joshi (2006b), Jackson and
Watts (2001) and Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007). In these examples, our results
contribute substantially more than the more general setup in Hellmann (2013).
Among those is the afore mentioned utility function given by Bonacich centrality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the model and
presents the important assumptions and definitions used throughout the paper.
Section 3 presents the results ordered by the externalities that are respectively
assumed. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a finite set of agents. Depending on the application these
can be firms, countries, individuals, etc. These economic agents strategically
form links and, thus, are henceforth called players. Throughout this paper we
will assume network formation to be undirected. A connection or link between
two players i ∈ N and j ∈ N , i 6= j will be denoted by {i, j} which we abbreviate
for simplicity by ij = ji := {i, j}. We then define the complete network gN =
{ij | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} as the network where any two players are connected to each
other and the set of all networks G = {g | g ⊆ gN}.
We will further denote the set of links of some player i in a network g by Li(g) =
{ij ∈ g | j ∈ N}, and all other links L−i(g) = g − Li(g) where g − g
′ := g \ g′
denotes the network obtained by deleting the set of links g′ ∩ g from network
g. Analogously, g + g′ := g ∪ g′. The set of player i′s neighbors is given by
Ni(g) = {j ∈ N | ij ∈ g} and ηi(g) = #Ni(g) is called the degree of player i.
Players have preferences over networks. With the usual assumptions on prefer-
ences, the profile of utility functions is denoted by u(g) = (u1(g), u2(g), ..., un(g)),
where ui is a mapping from G to R for all i ∈ N . The decision of adding or delet-
ing links is based on the marginal utility of each link. We denote the marginal
utility of deleting a set of links l ⊆ g from g as ∆ui(g, l) := ui(g) − ui(g − l),
and similarly the marginal utility of adding a set of links l ⊆ gN − g to g as
∆ui(g+ l, l) = ui(g+ l)−ui(g). Observe that in this definition, ui(g) may include
any kind of disutilities arising in network g such as costs of link formation. In
many examples from the literature linear costs of link formation are assumed,
such that the utility function has the form ui(g) = v(g)− cηi(g), where c > 0 is
some constant.
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Altogether, we will call G = (N,G, u) a society.
2.1 Network Formation and Stability
The study of equilibrium/stability of networks has been a subject of interest in
many models of network formation. Depending on the rules of network formation
which are assumed in a given model, there are many definitions of equilibrium
at hand. Here, we present only the well-known concept of pairwise stability
introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).2
Definition 1 (Pairwise Stability):
A network g in a society G = (N,G, u) is pairwise stable (PS) if
(i) ∀ij ∈ g : ∆ui(g, ij) ≥ 0 and ∆uj(g, ij) ≥ 0;
(ii) ∀ij /∈ g : ∆ui(g + ij, ij) > 0 ⇒ ∆uj(g + ij, ij) < 0.
This approach to stability defines desired properties directly on the set of net-
works. The implicit assumption of network formation underlying this approach
is that players are in control of their links; any player can unilaterally delete a
given link, but to form a link both involved players need to agree. The networks
which satisfy property (i) of Definition 1 are called link deletion proof and the
networks which satisfy (ii) are called link addition proof.
The intuition behind the definition of pairwise stability is that two players form
a link if one is strictly better off and the other is not worse off when forming
the link, while a link is deleted if one of the two involved players is better off
deleting the link. It should be noted that this definition of stability is rather a
necessary condition of stability as it is fairly weak. It can be refined to account for
multiple link deletion, called Pairwise Nash stability (Bloch and Jackson, 2006),
to account for network formation with transfers, called Pairwise stability with
transfers (Bloch and Jackson, 2007), and many more (see e.g. Jackson, 2008;
Hellmann and Staudigl, 2014, for a further discussion on different approaches to
stability).3
2A game theoretic foundation and a comparison of the several definitions of stability can be
found in Bloch and Jackson (2006).
3Some results presented here generalize to the stronger concept of pairwise Nash stability, also
know as pairwise equilibria. Pairwise Nash stable networks are immune against deletion of
any subsets of own links.
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2.2 Homogeneity
The central assumption underlying this paper is homogeneity of the society. That
is we assume all players to be ex-ante equal in order to assure that differences
in utility of two players in a given network solely depend on their respective
network positions but not on their name.4 We will establish this homogeneity
via an anonymity condition on the utility profile.
Definition 2 (Anonymity):
Let gpi := {π(i)π(j) | ij ∈ g} be the network obtained from a network g by some
permutation of players π : N → N . A profile of utility functions is anonymous if
ui(g) = upi(i)(gpi). (2.1)
A society G with a profile of utility functions satisfying anonymity will be called
homogeneous. As noted above, players in a homogeneous society are anonymous
in the sense that players in symmtric network positions receive the same utility.
The notion of symmetric position in a network, implied by Definition 2, is such
that two players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j are symmetric in a network g ∈ G if there exists
a permutation of the set of players π : N → N such that π(i) = j and gpi = g.
This is most trivially satisfied if two players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j share the same
neighbors (disregarding a possible common link), i.e. Ni(g−j) = Nj(g−i). On the
other hand, having the same degree is a necessary condition for two players to
be in a symmetric position.
Consequently, a network g ∈ G is called a symmetric network if all players are in
a symmetric position.5 Hence, a necessary condition for g to be symmetric is that
it is regular, i.e. that all players have the same degree. However, this condition is
not sufficient (see Figure 1). Some examples of symmetric positions in a network
and symmetric networks are given in Figure 1.
Moreover, with the notion of homogeneous society, it is easy to see that sym-
metric links provide the same marginal utility. For this, however, a symmetry
on links has to be imposed. To simplify things, note that for two players whose
neighborhood coincides (disregarding a mutual connection), any link to a third
player is symmetric which implies (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 1.
4In the setup at hand, ex-ante means before any network is formed.
5The graph theoretic equivalent to symmetric graphs we consider here are not symmetric, but
vertex-transitive graphs. In this setup, we need symmetry of the players, that is symmetry
of vertices whereas symmetry in graph theory would also demand edges to be symmetric.
For details see e.g. Biggs (1994).
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1 2 3
4 5
6 7 8
(a) Symmetric net-
work
1 2 3
4 5
6 7 8
(b) Non-symmetric
network
1 5
3 4
2 6
(c) Non-symmetric network
Figure 1: Networks (a) and (b) are regular, but only (a) is symmetric. In network
(b), two players of different components are not in symmetric positions.
In network (c), players 3 and 4 respectively players 1, 2, 5 and 6 are
symmetric, while the network is obviously not.
Lemma 1.
Let some profile of utility functions u satisfy anonymity. Then the following
statements are true:
(i) ui(g) = uj(g), if i and j are symmetric,
(ii) ∆ui(g + ik, ik) = ∆uj(g + jk, jk) ∀k ∈ N\Ni(g), if Ni(g−j) = Nj(g−i),
(iii) ∆uk(g + ik, ik) = ∆uk(g + jk, jk) ∀k ∈ N\Ni(g), if Ni(g−j) = Nj(g−i).
The proof of Lemma 1 as well as all following results can be found in the appendix.
From the proof it can be easily seen that parts (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 1 hold
likewise for all existing links ik, jk ∈ g.
2.3 Link externalities
Even if the society is homogeneous, pairwise stable networks may fail to exist.
Moreover, it is impossible to say anything about stability of particular network
structures without any assumptions on the utility function. In the literature on
network formation, however, many utility functions admit certain link externality
conditions. By link externalities we mean conditions on how marginal utility is
affected when links are added to or deleted from a network. Hence, without losing
much of the generality of our approach, we will examine whether stable networks
of certain structure exist if various combinations of link externalities in the con-
text of homogeneous societies are satisfied. We will consider the weakest version
of link externalities in the literature, namely the ordinal versions presented in
Hellmann (2013).6 For the sake of convenience, in the rest of the paper we will
6Ordinal link externalities as first defined by Hellmann (2013) are implied by the more com-
monly used but stronger cardinal link externalities (see e.g. Bloch and Jackson, 2006, 2007;
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speak about convexity, concavity, strategic complements and strategic substi-
tutes, keeping in mind that what is used are the respective ordinal formulations
of Definition 3.
Definition 3 (Ordinal link externalities):
A utility function ui satisfies ordinal convexity (concavity) in own links if for all
g ∈ G, li ⊆ Li(g
N − g) and ij /∈ g + li it holds that
∆ui(g + ij, ij) ≥ 0 ⇒ (⇐) ∆ui(g + li + ij, ij) ≥ 0. (2.2)
A utility function ui satisfies ordinal strategic complements (substitutes) if for
all g ∈ G, l−i ⊆ L−i(g
N − g) and ij ∈ Li(g
N − g) it holds that
∆ui(g + ij, ij) ≥ 0 ⇒ (⇐) ∆ui(g + l−i + ij, ij) ≥ 0. (2.3)
In Goyal and Joshi (2006b) two utility functions with a particular structure –
called playing the field and local spillovers– are studied with respect to existence
of stable networks. Both of these utility functions reduce the network to only one
characteristic: the vector of degrees, which reduces complexity a lot, but takes
away the generality and hence a whole field of possible applications. To establish
existence of stable networks, Goyal and Joshi (2006b) additionally assume various
combinations of cardinal notions of link externalities. It is straightforward to see
that our assumptions of homogeneity and ordinal link externalities are implied
by theirs. Hence not only with respect to not assuming a particular structure,
but also with respect to the notions of link externalities, our approach is a true
generalization of their approach and offers new opportunities to apply the results.
2.4 Example: Utility given by Bonacich Centrality
We illustrate our assumptions and results with the help of an example where
players have a desire to be central in a network. This also reflects the first ideas
of why individuals form links strategically (see e.g. Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996).
What exactly is meant by being central very much depends on the definition of
centrality (for a discussion and comparison of different measures of centrality, see
e.g. Jackson, 2008). In Jackson and Wolinsky’s influential connections models
players derive utility based on a version of decay or closeness centrality.
Network theory offers a wide variety of centrality measures, and some of them
have an interesting game theoretic interpretation. Bonacich (1987) introduced a
Goyal and Joshi, 2006b), as well as by several related concepts such as α-submodularity
(Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic¸, 2009).
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parametric family of centrality measures in order to formulate the intuitive idea
that the centrality of a single node in a network should depend on the centrality of
its neighbors. This self-referential definition of centrality leads to an eigenvector-
based measure, which can be derived from basic utility-maximization ideas, as
shown by Ballester et al. (2006). Let A be the n× n adjacency matrix of a given
network g and ~1 be the n × 1 vector with all entries equal to 1.7 The powers of
the adjacency matrix yield information about the connectivity structure of the
network. Indeed, A~1 is an n× 1 matrix whose entries are just the degrees of the
individual nodes. The vector A2~1 counts the number of paths of length 2 starting
from the individual nodes, and more generally Ak~1 counts the number of paths
of length k. Let δ > 0 be a given parameter, discounting for path length and
chosen in such a way that the following matrix power series exists:8
B(δ, g) =
∞∑
n=0
δnAn = [I − δA]−1.
The centrality index proposed by Bonacich (1987) is then defined as
b(δ, g) = B(δ, g)~1. (2.4)
This centrality measure is actually a Nash equilibrium of an interesting class of
non-cooperative games: Suppose there are N agents who are involved in a team
production problem (for an indepth introduction of this game, see Ballester et al.,
2006). Each player chooses a non-negative quantity xi ≥ 0, interpreted as efforts
invested in the team production. Efforts are costly, and the level of effort invested
by the other players affects the utility of player i. To capture these effects, let
the player i’s payoff from an effort profile x = (x1, . . . , xN ) be given by
πi(x1, . . . , xN) = xi −
1
2
x2i + δ
∑
j∈Ni
xixj.
The players choose their efforts independently, and in a utility maximizing way.
It can be shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium x∗ given by
x∗ = b(δ, g).
Hence, the equilibrium effort invested by player i depends only on her centrality
in the network. Given the network g, and discount factor δ ∈ R, so that (2.4) is
well defined, the equilibrium payoff of player i can be computed as9
πi(x
∗) =
1
2
bi(δ, g)
2. (2.5)
7The adjacency matrix A of a network g is a matrix with entries aij = 1 if ij ∈ g and
aij = 0 otherwise. Note that A is necessarily symmetric as we consider undirected network
formation.
8The necessary condition for this to be the case is that 0 < δ < λ1(A)
−1, where λ1(A) is the
eigenvalue of A having largest modulus.
9To see this, note that bi(g, δ) = 1 + δ
∑
j∈Ni
bj(g, δ).
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This utility function now represents preferences over a set of possible network
architectures underlying the team production problem. Hence, assuming Nash
equilibrium play in the game where players choose efforts, we can now use this de-
rived preference relation to investigate the equilibrium payoffs as functions of the
interaction structure. In fact, we can find many examples in the literature where
the equilibrium outcome of a game on a network is given by the Bonacich cen-
trality. Among those are models of production economy (Acemoglu et al., 2012),
R&D cooperation (Ko¨nig, 2012), local public goods (Allouch, 2012; Bramoulle´
et al., 2014), and trade (Bosker and Westbrock, 2014).
Thus, in a stage game such that players first decide to form costly links and then
choose efforts in a team production game, players will anticipate the equilibrium
in the second stage. Hence when they form links with linear costs the following
objective function arises,
uBCi (g) =
1
2
bi(δ, g)
2 − ηic. (2.6)
When considering link formation with the utility function uBCi (g) as the objective,
we have to make sure that bi(g, δ) is well defined for any network. Since the largest
eigenvalue λ1(g) is maximized for the complete network g
N , and we need δ < 1
λ1(g)
for bi(g, δ) to exist, we have to assume
δ <
1
λ1(gN)
=
1
n− 1
, (2.7)
in order to define a consistent model of network formation. In other words, the
set of admissible discount factors is given by δ ∈ [0, 1
n−1
).
This profile of utility functions obviously satisfies anonymity. Moreover, it is
quite intuitive to see that the Bonacich centrality bi(g, δ) satisfies positive link
externalities, i.e. convexity and strategic complements as in Definition 3, since
more own or other players’ links increase the number of paths that a new link
creates. Since a convex transformation does not change this fact and linking costs
are linear, marginal utility is increasing in own and other players’ links.
It is worth noting that to our best knowledge, there is only one result from the
literature that can be applied to shed some light into the structure of pairwise
stable networks when individuals form links according to uBCi . From Hellmann
(2013) it is known that a pairwise stable network exists. Other models are not
applicable, since uBCi does not fall in the category of playing the field and local
spillover games of Goyal and Joshi (2006b), and does not allow for a network
potential (cf. Jackson and Watts, 2001; Chakrabarti and Gilles, 2007). Hence,
with our general assumptions of this paper, we are able to offer some insights
into the structure of pairwise stable networks of this type of utility function.
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3 Strategic Complements
In this section we assume that the profile of utility functions satisfies the ordinal
notion of strategic complements. Such link externalities are given if the incentives
to form links are single crossing in other players’ links in the sense that once the
incentive to form a link is positive, it stays positive when links of other players
are added. The more restrictive cardinal notion of strategic complements would
imply that the incentive to form links is increasing in other players’ links. Hence
there is a form of complementarity between links at work: Links to other players
become more valuable when links between other players are added.
However, there are two kinds of link externalities which are not captured by the
assumption of ordinal strategic complements. First, it is not clear what the effect
of own links is on incentives to form links. When these are negative, this could
potentially lead to cycling behavior.10 Second (and this cannot be captured by
the cardinal notion either), strategic complements do not specify on which links
the effect of other players’ links is stronger. That is, if two players k and l form a
link, does this increase the incentive for player i 6∈ {k, l} more to link to k (resp.
l) than to j 6∈ {k, l}, or vice versa?
To capture these different externalities in a homogeneous society, we will first
assume that additionally to strategic complements, incentives from own links are
not “too negative” in a well defined sense (Definition 4). With these assumptions
an already strong existence result can be established which trivially also holds
for the case when both link externalities are positive. We then show that in such
an environment, it is possible to characterize a class of networks to which all
pairwise stable networks belong, if the society is more homogeneous. By that, we
mean that the strategic complements property and the convexity property act
homogeneously on all links. In the case of strategic complements, this results
in the fact that players prefer to connect to players with higher degree. We
call this a strong preference for centrality (see Section 3.2) since this reflects a
preference to be central in the network. These assumption is not far-fetched. We
discuss examples satisfying it, among them the utility function where benefits
are given by Bonacich centrality, i.e. uBCi . Finally, we show in Section 3.3, that
in a homogeneous society, strategic complements alone (in settings where the
utility functions depends on the vector of degrees and the network structure)
are sufficient for the existence of a pairwise stable network within the class of
symmetric networks.
10In the opposite case of both externalities from own and other players links being positive,
it is shown in Hellmann (2013) that closed cycles do not exist (see Jackson and Wolinsky,
1996, for a definition of closed improving cycles).
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3.1 Link Monotonicity
When the incentives to form links are increasing in both own and other players’
links, then network formation is reminiscent of the structure of a supermodular
game, where equilibria are easy to characterize. However, pairwise stable net-
works are not necessarily Nash equilibria of an underlying game.11 We show here
that the idea of assuming increasing incentives, i.e. positive link externalities,
can be relaxed in two ways: first, strategic complements only need to hold in
ordinal terms, and second, externalities from own links may not satisfy the single
crossing property, but instead shall not be “too negative”. In particular, we want
the potential negative effect of adding own links not to dominate the positive
effect of addition of other players’ links. This idea is inspired by the notion of
link monotonicity in Goyal and Joshi (2006b). Their notion can be generalized
to our general utility function and to only hold in ordinal terms. We formally
define that a utility profile satisfies ordinal link monotonicity if the addition of
an own link and some other player’s link to any given network at the same time
does not turn marginal utility negative for any player.
Definition 4 (Link Monotocity):
A utility function ui satisfies ordinal link monotonicity if for all j, k, l,m ∈ N\{i}
and all g ∈ G:
∆ui(g + ij, ij) > (≥) 0 ⇒ ∆ui(g + ik + lm+ ij, ij) > (≥) 0, (3.1)
Trivially, if externalities from own and other players’ links are both positive (cf.
Definition 3), then ordinal link monotonicity is satisfied, but not vice versa. Also
our notion of ordinal link monotonicity is implied by the assumption of link
monotonicity in Goyal and Joshi (2006b).
Now, in a homogeneous society, if the empty network is not stable, then any two
players want to connect to each other (cf. Lemma 2). In the presence of link
monotonicity and strategic complements, this implies that a player with less own
links than the total number of other players’ links, has an incentive to add any
link. We then show that if the number of players n is at least five, then there
always exist two unconnected players satisfying the above, what implies that they
both want to connect to each other. Hence, only the complete network can be
stable which is summarized in the following result.
11The non-cooperative game underlying network formation is due to Myerson (1991), where
the intentions to form links are announced. Nash equilibria of this game are immune to
multiple link deletion and do not consider link addition.
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Proposition 1.
Let n > 4 and let the profile of utility functions u satisfy the ordinal strategic
complements property, ordinal link monotonicity and anonymity. If the empty
network is not pairwise stable then the complete network is uniquely pairwise
stable, and vice versa.
Hence, if the society is homogeneous and ordinal strategic complements dominate
externalities from own links such that link monotonicity is satisfied, then the
pairwise stable networks have an interesting structure: if multiple networks are
pairwise stable, then there always exists a smallest and a largest stable network
in the sense of the set inclusion ordering, namely the empty and the complete
network. To the contrary, if one of these networks fails to be pairwise stable, then
the other network is uniquely pairwise stable, i.e. the least and maximal network
coincide.
Note that the assumptions in Proposition 1 allow for negative effects from both
own and other players’ links and that even concave utility functions are allowed as
long as the ordinal properties of strategic complements and link monotonicity are
preserved. Hence, the range of possible applications is large, establishing a strong
existence result. In such network formation models, it suffices to check the empty
and the complete network in order to find a pairwise stable network. Especially in
large societies, where the number of different networks is enormous,12 this offers
an easy way to find a stable network.
As a direct consequence of Proposition 1 we get the same result in case of ordinal
positive externalities since convexity and strategic complements imply ordinal
link monotonicity. In this case the result also holds for n ≤ 4.
Corollary 1.
Let the profile of utility functions u satisfy the ordinal strategic complements
property, ordinal convexity in own links and anonymity. If the empty network
is not pairwise stable then the complete network is uniquely pairwise stable, and
vice versa.
A comparison to the literature may be in order here. First, Goyal and Joshi
(2006b) assume a lot more structure on the functional form of utility and combine
these with cardinal assumptions of link externalities. Although our approach is
more general, we are able to contribute more concerning the stability of complete
and empty network (cf. Goyal and Joshi, 2006b, Proposition 4.1).13 Second,
12In a society of n agents, the cardinality of G is 2n(n−1)/2.
13Note that Goyal and Joshi (2006b) do not get the same since their focus is on existence of
pairwise Nash stable networks rather than pairwise stable networks.
13
Hellmann (2013) studies the same assumptions on link externalities as Corollary
1, but for heterogeneous societies. There, only existence can be established,
implying that the homogeneity assumption has some impact here.
As noted in Section 2.4, when benefits are given by a convex transformation of
Bonacich centrality and link costs are linear (2.6), then positive link externalities
and anonymity are satisfied. Hence, by Corollary 1, the empty or the complete
network are uniquely stable or that both are stable in this setting.
3.2 Centrality-based Utility Functions
Although it is possible to gain some insights into the structure of pairwise stable
networks in a homogeneous society when ordinal link externalities are not too
negative, these assumptions are not sufficient to characterize all pairwise stable
networks. In particular, it would be interesting to examine which stable struc-
tures emerge when the least and maximal stable network do not coincide, such
that multiple stable networks exist. However, in the general framework that we
impose here there is little hope to say more about the structure of pairwise stable
networks without putting stronger assumptions on the utility function.
The basic idea behind network formation starting from the seminal contribution
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is that players have a desire to be as central as
possible in the network. In these settings, players prefer the connection to a
central player over the connection to a peripheral player. We reflect this idea by
defining centrality based utility functions by a weak notion and a strong notion.
Definition 5 (Weak and Strong Preference for Centrality):
A utility function ui satisfies weak preference for centrality (WPC) if for all
g ∈ G, whenever there exist j, k ∈ N\Ni(g) such that Nj(g−k) ⊆ Nk(g−j) it holds
that
∆ui(g + ij, ij) ≥ (>)0 ⇒ ∆ui(g + ik, ik) ≥ (>)0, (3.2)
A utility profile ui satisfies strong preference for centrality (SPC) if for all g ∈ G,
η(g) ∈ {0, .., n− 1}n such that ηj(g) ≤ ηk(g) it holds that
∆ui(g, ij) ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆ui(g + ik, ik) > 0. (3.3)
Our weak notion of preference for centrality captures all reasonable notions of
centrality based utility functions: player k is more central than j if k’s neighbors
are a superset of j’s, and hence any player, who has an incentive to connect
to j, also has an incentive to connect to k. The definition of weak preference
for centrality, hence, represents a necessary condition for centrality cased utility
14
functions,14 and thus leaves room for many utility functions, also for those which
are not directly concerned with centrality itself. Examples of utility functions
satisfying WPC are e.g. the connections model (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996),
and the utility function with Bonacich centrality as the objective (cf. Section 2.4).
The notion of strong preference for centrality is more demanding: player i has
an incentive to connect to k if i has an incentive to connect to j and k has more
neighbors than j. Expressed in cardinal terms, this means that a player prefers
to connect players with higher number of neighbors.15 To interpret this definition
in terms of link externalities, consider a stronger notion of homogeneity such that
players have the same incentive to connect to players with the same degree. If
this is the case then it is easy to see that SPC is implied by ordinal strategic
complements. Hence, the condition of SPC can be satisfied in terms of more
homogeneous societies when utility satisfies strategic complements.
To capture externalities from own links consider the following notion of anony-
mous convextiy.
Definition 6 (Anonymous Convexity):
A utility profile u satisfies anonymous convexity (AC) if for all g ∈ G, η(g) ∈
{0, .., n− 1}n such that ηi(g) ≤ ηj(g), it holds that
∆ui(g, ik) ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆uj(g + jk, jk) ≥ 0. (3.4)
Anonymous convexity is a somehow stronger notion of ordinal convexity since it
implicitly assumes a higher degree of homogeneity (similarly to above): if a player
i likes the connection to k then any player with more links also has an incentive
to connect to k. In a more homogeneous society where players with same degree
have the same incentives, this formulation reflects the idea of ordinal convexity
since once the marginal utility of a link is positive, it stays positive if own links
are added. Hence anonymous convexity translates the convexity notion to other
players.
Recall that we aim at characterizing a class of networks which incorporates all
pairwise stable networks. The set of networks that we will need is given by the
following definition.
14We mean here necessary conditions for centrality based utility functions in terms of connec-
tivity. To the contrary, utility functions based on betweenness centrality where players have
an incentive to locate at structural holes may not satisfy weak preference for centrality, see
also Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007).
15Note further that in the definition of SPC, we used the fact that ij is already in g such
that after the addition of the link ik player k has indeed strictly more links. Defining
SPC (Definition 3.3) this way helps simplifying notation since we do not have to deal with
distinguishing weak and strict inequalities for several cases. AC (Definition 6) is analogously
defined.
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3 4
(a) P4: Path of
length 4
1 2
3 4
(b) C4: Cycle of
size 4
1 2
3 4
(c) K2,2: Two com-
plete size 2 com-
ponents
Figure 2: A network is a nested split graph if it does not contain a set of four
players who form one of the subgraphs P4, C4, K2,2.
Definition 7 (Nested Split Graphs):
A network g ∈ G is a nested split graph (NSG) if for all players i, j, k ∈ N such
that
ηi(g) ≥ ηj(g) ≥ ηk(g),
we have that if ik ∈ g then also ij ∈ g and if jk ∈ g then also ik ∈ g.
In a nested split graph the neighborhood structure of all players is nested in the
sense that for any two players i, j ∈ N the set of their neighbors can be ordered
according to the set inclusion order, i.e. Ni(g−j) ⊆ Nj(g−i) or Ni(g−j) ⊇ Nj(g−i).
Our Definition 7 can be straightforwardly seen to be equivalent to the ones in
Cvetkovic´ and Rowlinson (1990), Mahadev and Peled (1995), and Simic´ et al.
(2006). In particular, a network is NSG if and only if it does not contain a path
(P4), a cycle (C4) or two connected pairs (K2,2) when restricted to any 4 players
(see Figure 2). Moreover, nested split graphs maximize the largest eigenvalue of
networks that contain the same number of links.16
More importantly for our purposes, the set of nested split graphs contains all
pairwise stable networks when the profile of utility functions satisfies SPC and
AC.
Proposition 2.
Suppose a profile of utility functions satisfies strong preference for centrality and
anonymous convexity. Then any pairwise stable network is a nested split graph.
Although the utility function is not specified in our framework, we learn a lot
about the structure of pairwise stable networks: in a pairwise stable network we
can order any two players’ neighbors with respect to the set inclusion order when
16For a further elaboration on nested split graphs see Ko¨nig et al. (2014).
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SPC and AC are satisfied. This reduces the set of possible candidates for PS
networks considerably as the set of NSG’s only make up a very small fraction of
the set of all possible networks G.
The assumptions needed in this result may seem demanding at first sight. How-
ever, the conditions of SPC and AC may very naturally be implied by the other
notions of link externalities. To see this most easily, consider again the framework
of Goyal and Joshi (2006b). There, both conditions SPC and AC are automati-
cally satisfied in both playing the field and local spillover games, when assuming
convexity and strategic complements. Hence, in more homogeneous societies,
these notions are implied by positive link externalities. In particular, the exam-
ple of provision of a pure public good in Goyal and Joshi (2006b), inspired by
a model of Bloch (1997), satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 2. Note also
that by SPC and AC we just assumed ordinal notions, such that negative effects
from adding links can still occur, as long as the single crossing properties of these
definitions are preserved.
Further, with our general approach we are able to study interesting utility func-
tions which do not fall into the class of playing the field or local spillover games
in Goyal and Joshi (2006b). One such example is given by the important class
of utility where players strive for maximizing their Bonacich centrality given by
(2.6). In fact, it is possible to show that for low enough discount factors the
utility profile uBC satisfies SPC and AC and therefore pairwise stable networks
are of nested split architecture.
Corollary 2.
The profile of utility functions uBC defined by (2.6) satisfies strong preference for
centrality and anonymous convexity for any discount factor δ < 1
(n−1)2
.
Although the utility function given by the Bonacich centrality seems to be quite
a complex object since it considers the infinite discounted sum of all possible
paths in the networks, it is possible to characterize the set of pairwise stable
networks at least for low enough discount factors. This is due to the fact that
uBC satisfies SPC for these low discount factors since the benefits from second
order connections (degree of neighbors) dominate any benefits from higher order
connections which is shown in the proof of Corollary 2. Hence, although our
results hold for general utility functions, they are still applicable to interesting
classes of utility functions and help characterize the structure of PS networks,
even where no results are available so far.
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3.3 Existence of Symmetric Networks
A natural question that may arise when studying homogeneous societies is whether
we always get existence of symmetric network structures which are pairwise sta-
ble, since in symmetric networks all players receive the same utility by Lemma 1.
However, incentives to form different links may differ even in symmetric net-
works, since in our notion a symmetric network is vertex transitive but not edge
transitive (the former always exists for any degree, see Lemma 2, while especially
for high degrees there may not exist edge transitive networks). In the previous
section, we did get existence of symmetric networks since either the empty or
the complete network is always pairwise stable, although the structure of stable
networks in general can be quite asymmetric (see e.g. Proposition 2).
In this section, we will show that strategic complements alone is sufficient to es-
tablish the existence of a pairwise stable network of symmetric architecture for a
broad range of utility profiles. To establish the existence result we require that a
symmetric network of any degree exists. Since existence of regular networks for
all possible degrees only holds if the number of nodes n is even and regularity is
necessary for symmetry, we will first assume an even number of players. If n is
even, then it is indeed possible to show that according to our definition of sym-
metry (i.e. vertex-transitive graphs, cf. Section 2.2), there also exist symmetric
networks of any degree.
Lemma 2 (Existence of symmetric networks).
Suppose the number of players n = |N | is even. Then for any degree p such that
0 ≤ p ≤ n − 1, there exists a symmetric network grp. Hence, for anonymous
utility functions there exists for any degree p a network grp which satisfies that
ui(g
r
p) = uj(g
r
p) for all i, j ∈ N .
In the proof we construct a sequence of symmetric bipartite networks starting
from the empty network until the complete symmetric bipartite network (of de-
gree n
2
) is reached, from which the respective complements are again symmetric
and reach the complete network. Notice that this construction does not repre-
sent a sequence of link addition leading from the empty to the complete network.
There is a rearrangement of links when moving from the complete bipartite net-
work gbipn/2 to the complement of the bipartite network g
bip
n/2−1, as illustrated in
Figure 3. In general, it is straightforward to see that a sequence of link addition
encompassing symmetric networks of every degree does not exist.17
In the proof of the following result we make use of such link addition paths to the
17Note to the contrary, we can always construct a link addition sequence encompassing regular
networks of all degrees.
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(a) gbipn/2
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5 6
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(b) gN − gbip3
Figure 3: The complete symmetric bipartite network gbipn/2 and a network of same
degree for which the complement is bipartite.
point where the complete bipartite network gbipn/2 is reached to apply the strategic
complements property. Thus we need to make an additional assumption to assure
that on the one hand it is possible to choose the path that leads to the symmetric
network of next higher degree. On the other hand, we need to ensure that when
switching from the complete bipartite network to a complement of a symmetric
bipartite network of same degree then deletion the incentive to keep links do not
turn negative. A straightforward (and certainly not the most general) way to
guarantee this is to assume degree-based utility profiles, such that utility of any
player has the form
ui(g) ≡ ui
(
ηi(g), (ηj(g))j∈Ni(g), (ηk(g))k/∈Ni(g)
)
.
While this assumption seems demanding as utility now solely depends on the
degree of players, the great majority of examples in the literature complies with
it, including all utility profiles in Goyal and Joshi (2006b).
Proposition 3.
Suppose the number of players n is even and the profile of degree-based utility
functions satisfies strategic complements and anonymity. Then there exists a
symmetric network which is pairwise stable.
The assumption of the utility profile being degree-based can be interpreted as
a strengthening of the anonymity assumption. In case of an anonymous utility
profile players do not discriminate between others that are in symmetric network
positions and where both links are edge symmetric. Here, players discriminate
neither between players of same degree they are connected to, nor between players
of same degree they are not connected to.
Hence, we generically arrive at a general result: there always exists a symmetric
network if strategic complements are satisfied. The driving force of existence of
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a symmetric network seems to be the anonymity assumption alongside with the
condition of strategic complements. In settings where strategic complements are
not satisfied, it is easy to show that there might not exist a stable symmetric
network in a homogeneous society (this even holds in the reduced framework of
Goyal and Joshi (2006b), see also Section 4).
For Proposition 3 it is necessary to assume that the number of players n is
even. Otherwise there do not exist symmetric networks for every degree. In the
appendix, we show that for societies of an odd number of players that almost
symmetric networks are stable if we additionally assume weak preference for
centrality.
Because of the construction of link addition in Proposition 3, we can deduce as a
corollary of Proposition 3 the existence of a symmetric stable bipartite network in
a framework of two-sided network formation. Suppose there are two groups (e.g.
buyers and sellers) of the same size. Links can only be formed across both groups
such that the set of all networks is restricted to the set of bipartite networks,
Gbipn/2 := {g | g ⊆ g
bip
n/2}. Such a network formation model of buyers and sellers
is formally introduced in Kranton and Minehart (2001), see also Polanski and
Vega-Redondo (2013). Another example are two-sided matching markets, see
e.g. to Roth and Sotomayor (1992). When network formation is restricted to
links across two groups, it is trivially possible to apply the insights of Lemma 2
and Proposition 3. Hence, existence of a stable symmetric bipartite (buyer seller)
network is guaranteed, and we get the following result.
Corollary 3.
Consider network formation of a homogeneous society G := (N,Gbipn/2, u) where
the profile of utility functions is degree based and satisfies strategic complements.
Then there always exists a symmetric network that is pairwise stable.
The proof follows directly from Proposition 3.
4 Convexity
We finally want to assess which networks are likely to form in homogeneous
societies when strategic complements are not necessarily satisfied, but instead
we assume that the utility function is convex in own links. Recall that ordinal
convexity as given in Definition 3 orders the externalities of own links on marginal
utility in a way that, once positive, it will stay positive whenever own links are
added to the network. In presence of this form of complementarity between own
links the intuition is that players that already have links are likely to strive for
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more. Notice however that due to ambiguous marginal effects of other links still
cycling behavior may arise in link formation such that no pairwise stable network
would exist.
To the contrary, we show in the following that with the additional assumption
of WPC as in Definition 5 stable networks still exist. We find existence of stable
networks in the class of dominant group networks. A network is of dominant
group architecture if a subset of 0 ≤ m ≤ n− 1 players constitutes a completely
connected subgraph, while all other n−m players remain isolated. We will denote
a dominant group network with a complete subgraph of size m by gdgm .
Proposition 4.
Suppose the profile of utility functions satisfies convexity, anonymity and WPC
as in Definition 5. Then there exists a pairwise stable network of dominant group
architecture gdgm , for some 0 ≤ m ≤ n− 1.
The intuition for Proposition 4 is as follows. First, as marginal utility satisfies
convexity, players incentive to form a link is not destroyed by additional own
links. Second, they tend to connect to players that already have more links, due
to WPC. Both effects together point to networks where players either have a lot
or no links. In the proposition we then naturally find the stable networks in the
extreme case, namely one completely connected subgroup and one subgroup of
isolated players (one of these sets can be empty).
Let us emphasize again that WPC is a very weak assumption since it rather
defines necessary conditions of preferences to be central in the network. Further,
both WPC and convexity only need to be satisfied in ordinal terms such that
the overall effect can be negative. There are many examples from the literature
which satisfy Proposition 4. We take a closer look at two of those examples where
stronger convexity assumptions result in dominant group networks being even the
unique pairwise stable network architecture.
Example 1 (Cost-reducing collaboration in oligopoly). One classical ex-
ample in the literature considers a Cournot oligopoly of n firms that are sup-
posed to be ex-ante identical, but can form bilateral collaboration links lowering
their respective marginal costs (Goyal and Joshi, 2003, 2006b; Dawid and Hell-
mann, 2014).
The authors show that the equilibrium quantities of each firm are
qi(g) =
(a− γ0) + (n− 1)γηi(g)− γ
∑
j 6=i ηj(g−i)
n+ 1
, i ∈ N,
while Cournot profits are given by πi(g) = q
2
i (g). This results in marginal profit
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of an additional link ij /∈ g being
∆πi(g + ij, ij) =
γ(n− 1)
(n+ 1)2
[
2(α− γ0) + γ(n− 1) + 2γnηi(g)− 2γ
∑
j 6=i
ηj(g)
]
− f,
where f are the costs of forming a link. From marginal utility it can be de-
rived that ordinal convexity is satisfied (see also Dawid and Hellmann, 2014).
What is more, WPC is satisfied as firms do not discriminate between different
partners when deciding with whom to link in this game. Thus we are indeed
in the situation of Proposition 4 and there exists a network of dominant group
architecture in this setup.
As firms however do not discriminate their neighbors by their network position
and utility is (in fact) strictly convex, marginal utility even yields the following
special property:
∆ui(g, ij) ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆ui(g + ik, ik) > 0 ∀k ∈ N\{i} (4.1)
Here, Property 4.1 is stronger than the condition of Anonymous Convexity
(Definition 6). If such a strong property is satisfied in a network formation
game, then it is straightforward to see that only networks of dominant group
architecture can be pairwise stable.
Proposition 5.
Suppose a profile of utility functions satisfies the property given in (4.1). Then
any pairwise stable network is of dominant group architecture.
The proof is rather trivial (and hence skipped in the appendix): If a network
is stable, then no link can be deleted, which means that for any link ij ∈ g we
have ∆ui(g, ij) ≥ 0 which implies that any player who has a link wants a link
to any other player by (4.1). Hence, the only possible pairwise stable network
architecture in this case is the dominant group architecture.
Thus, Proposition 5 implies the result by Goyal and Joshi (2003) that all pair-
wise stable collaboration networks are dominant group networks in the case of
Cournot competition.
Example 2 (Bonacich Centrality revisited). In Section 3.2 we have shown
that Bonacich utility uBC satisfies convexity and SPC for discount factors δ <
1
(n−1)2
, so that we are in the situation of Proposition 4.18
However, we argue that an even stronger anonymity property will yield that
dominant group networks are even the unique pairwise stable networks. Ob-
18Remember that WPC required in Proposition 4 follows from SPC.
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serve first that in Corollary 2 we have shown that uBC satisfies anonymous
convexity, such that for any i, j, k ∈ N and ηi(g) ≤ ηj(g) it is
∆uBCi (g, ik) ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆u
BC
j (g + jk, jk) ≥ 0. (4.2)
Moreover, from equation (6.6) in the proof it can be directly seen that anony-
mous convexity in fact holds independently of the respective numbers of links of
players i and j, such that uBC actually satisfies the following stronger property
∆ui(g, ik) ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆uj(g + jk, jk) > 0 ∀j ∈ Nk(g
N − g), (4.3)
such that if some player has an incentive to connect to k, then all other players
also want to connect to k.
As in the previous example, this is a strong property since it is implied by
convexity in very homogeneous societies satisfying independence of own links.
Moreover, while Property (4.3) is not quite the same as Property (4.1) in the
first example, it is again easy to understand that only dominant group networks
can be pairwise stable.
Proposition 6.
Suppose a profile of utility functions satisfies the property given in (4.3). Then
any pairwise stable network is of dominant group architecture.
Again, this is a rather trivial statement: If some player has positive marginal
utility from a link to a player k, then anyone in the society wants to be connected
to k and consequently all non-isolated players have to be mutually connected.
Finally, since uBC satisfies Property 4.3, we can conclude that for low discount
factors, any network is of dominant group architecture. Of course this does not
contradict Corollary 2, as the set of dominant group networks is a subset of the
set of nested split graphs.
5 Conclusion
In this paper the assumption of homogeneous agents is exploited in the setting
of endogenous network formation to establish the existence of pairwise stable
networks in presence of various combinations of link externalities.
While homogeneity was implicitly assumed in most works on existence conditions
for stable networks, the main contribution of our work is to make this assumption
explicit, maintaining an otherwise very general setup. We thus have been able to
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show that the driving force for existence are indeed the respective link externality
conditions.
A second contribution is the characterization of specific network architectures
that emerge in presence of link externalities. In the spirit of Goyal and Joshi
(2006b) the emergence of regular networks in case of strategic complements was
shown, while dominant group networks are likely to emerge in case of convexity.
We even go one step further in this work. When the society becomes more and
more homogeneous, not only existence is guaranteed but we are able to determine
classes of networks which contain all stable networks even though we have not
assumed a functional form of utility. We find many examples that benefit from
such characterization since previous results are not applicable.
While the present work exhibits a focus on positive link externalities it would be
interesting for future research to show similar results in case of negative link ex-
ternalities. Our conjecture for the case of both concavity and strategic substitutes
however is that existence of pairwise stable networks is not always guaranteed.
While an example of four players not yielding a pairwise stable network is pre-
sented in Hellmann (2013), this requires heterogeneous players. In fact, it is
relatively easy to show that such an example for a homogeneous society cannot
be constructed for five or less players, thus this remains a task for future research.
Second, a full characterization of pairwise stable networks if utility profiles are
functions of Bonacich centrality still remains an open question of highest interest.
While we provide a first contribution to this goal, proving existence of a pairwise
stable network for any discount factor and characterizing stable networks for low
discount factors, it still remains a challenge to characterize stable networks for
the rest of the set of admissible discount factors. Our conjecture is that pairwise
stable networks are a subset of nested split graphs. Since Bonacich centrality
is found to be the equilibrium payoff in many network formation games in the
recent literature, such result would be of highest interest for the ongoing research
in this area.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let the profile of utility functions u satisfy anonymity.
(i). Suppose that i, j ∈ N are symmetric such that there exists a permutation π
with π(i) = j and gpi = g. Then by anonymity, we get
ui(g) = upi(i)(gpi) = uj(g).
(ii). Now let i, j ∈ N such that Ni(g−j) = Nj(g−i). Define πij as the permutation
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where players i and j switch positions, that is
πij : N → N, πij(k) = k ∀k ∈ N \ {i, j}, πij(i) = j.
Then since Ni(g−j) = Nj(g−i) we have gpiij = g. Take now any k ∈ N\{i, j} and
define g˜ = g + ik. Anonymity then yields
ui(g + ik) = ui(g˜) = upiij(i)(g˜piij) = uj(g + jk).
Then it directly follows that
∆ui(g + ik, ik) = ui(g + ik)− ui(g) = uj(g + jk)− uj(g) = ∆uj(g + jk, jk).
(iii). By the same arguments as in (ii) we get
uk(g + ik) = uk(g˜) = upiij(k)(g˜piij) = uk(g + jk).
and consequently
∆uk(g + ik, ik) = uk(g + ik)− uk(g) = uk(g + jk)− uk(g) = ∆uj(g + jk, jk).
Proof of Proposition 1. Let g∅ be not pairwise stable. Take now any g ∈ G. We
need to show that g is not PS unless g = gN .
Recalling that Li(g) denotes the set of links in g that connect i, we denote
li(g) := |Li(g)| and analogously l−i(g) := |L−i(g)|.
First, consider a player i ∈ N such that in network g we have li(g) ≤ l−i(g). By
anonymity of the utility profile we have ∆ui(g
∅ + ij, ij) > 0 for all i, j ∈ N since
the empty network is assumed to be not PS. We then get, for L¯−i(g) ⊆ L−i(g)
with l¯−i(g) := |L¯−i(g)| = li(g),
∆ui(g
∅ + ij, ij) > 0
⇒ ∆ui(Li(g) + L¯−i(g) + ij, ij) > 0
⇒ ∆ui(g + ij, ij) > 0,
for all j ∈ N , where the first implication holds by link monotonicity while the
latter one holds by strategic complements.
Thus, no network g ∈ G such that there exist two players i, j ∈ N with ij /∈ g
and li(g) ≤ l−i(g), lj(g) ≤ l−j(g) can be PS since i and j have an incentive to
connect to each other. Define the set of players that satisfy li(g) ≤ l−i(g) by
E(g) := {i ∈ N : li(g) ≤ l−i(g)} and its complement by E
c(g) := N − E(g).
Denoting for A ⊆ N by g|A := {ij ∈ g|i, j ∈ A} the network restricted to A,
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above reasoning implies that in order for g to be PS, g|E(g) must be completely
connected. For the remainder of the proof assume, hence, that g|E(g) is completely
connected.
Now, consider Ec(g). Note that for any network, in particular for g|Ec(g) we have,∑
k∈Ec(g)
lk(g|Ec(g)) = 2|g|Ec(g)| = 2li(g|Ec(g)) + 2l−i(g|Ec(g)) (6.1)
for all i ∈ Ec(g). The first equality is due to the fact that each link in the network
g|Ec(g) is counted twice in the sum
∑
k∈Ec(g) lk(g|Ec(g)), and the second equality
is trivial since the number of links in each network is simply the sum of own
links and other players’ links which is true for every player. Summing over all
i ∈ Ec(g) then yields
∑
i∈Ec(g)

 ∑
k∈Ec(g)
lk(g|Ec(g))

 = 2 ∑
i∈Ec(g)
li(g|Ec(g)) + 2
∑
i∈Ec(g)
l−i(g|Ec(g))
⇔ (|Ec(g)| − 2)

 ∑
k∈Ec(g)
lk(g|Ec(g))

 = 2 ∑
k∈Ec(g)
l−k(g|Ec(g)). (6.2)
In order to complete the proof, we show that Ec(g) must be the empty set. To
the contrary, suppose that |Ec(g)| ≥ 4. Hence (6.2) implies∑
k∈Ec(g)
lk(g|Ec(g)) ≤
∑
k∈Ec(g)
l−k(g|Ec(g)). (6.3)
Denote by l˜ the number of links connecting E(g) and Ec(g), i.e. l˜ := |{ij ∈
g | i ∈ E(g), j ∈ Ec(g)}|. Then,
∑
k∈Ec(g) lk(g) =
∑
k∈Ec(g) lk(g|Ec(g)) + l˜ and∑
k∈Ec(g) l−k(g|Ec(g))+(|E
c(g)|−1)l˜ ≤
∑
k∈Ec(g) l−k(g). Since |E
c(g)| ≥ 4, we then
get by (6.3),
∑
k∈Ec(g) lk(g) ≤
∑
k∈Ec(g) l−k(g), contradicting that li(g) > l−i(g)
for all i ∈ Ec(g).
Finally consider |Ec(g)| ≤ 3. Note that by assumption n ≥ 5. If |Ec(g)| ∈ {1, 2},
there is at most one link in g|Ec(g) while |E(g)| ≥ 3 and completely connected,
implying that li(g) ≤ 1 < 3 ≤ l−i(g) for i ∈ E
c(g), a contradiction. If |Ec(g)| = 3
there are at most three links in g|Ec(g). We hence have
∑
k∈Ec(g) lk(g|Ec(g)) ≤∑
k∈Ec(g) l−k(g|Ec(g)) + 3. Since n ≥ 5 and hence |E(g)| ≥ 2 we have |g|E(g)| ≥ 1
and thus if there are no connections between E(g) and E(gc), l−i(g|Ec(g)) + 1 ≤
l−i(g) for all i ∈ E
c(g). Denoting, as above, by l˜ the number of links connecting
E(g) and Ec(g), we then get∑
k∈Ec(g)
lk(g) = l˜ +
∑
k∈Ec(g)
lk(g|Ec(g)) ≤ 3 + l˜ +
∑
k∈Ec(g)
l−k(g|Ec(g)) ≤
∑
k∈Ec(g)
l−k(g),
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contradicting that li(g) > l−i(g) for all i ∈ E
c(g). Thus Ec(g) must be the
empty set implying that g = g|E(g) and hence must be completely connected to
be pairwise stable.
The equivalent argument in case of gN not being deletion proof completes the
proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. Let g∅ be not pairwise stable. Take now any g ∈ G. We
need to show that g is not PS unless g = gN .
First, by anonymity of the utility profile we have ∆ui(g
∅ + ij, ij) > 0 for all
i, j ∈ N . Now, take the decomposition of g into Li(g) (links of player i) and
L−i(g) (all other links), and observe that
∆ui(g
∅ + ij, ij) > 0
⇒∆ui(g
∅ + Li(g) + ij, ij) > 0
⇒∆ui(g
∅ + Li(g) + L−i(g) + ij, ij) > 0
⇒∆ui(g + ij, ij) > 0, (6.4)
where the first implication holds by convexity and the second one by strategic
complements. Thus, no network but the complete one can be addition proof.
Finally, as (6.4) holds also for g = gN − ij and for all i, j ∈ N , the complete
network gN is deletion proof and thus pairwise stable.
The equivalent argument in case of gN not being deletion proof completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a pairwise sta-
ble network which is not a nested split graph. Then by definition there exists a
set of three distinct players i, j, k, such that ηi(g) ≥ ηj(g) ≥ ηk(g), and either
ik ∈ g while ij /∈ g or jk ∈ g while ik /∈ g.
Suppose first ik ∈ g, ij /∈ g. Since g is assumed to be stable, we have ∆ui(g, ik) ≥
0 and ∆uk(g, ik) ≥ 0. Then however
∆ui(g, ik) ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆ui(g + ij, ij) > 0,
following by SPC, and further
∆uk(g, ik) ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆uj(g + ij, ij) ≥ 0,
following by anonymous convexity. Thus i and j would want to add a link to g,
contradicting pairwise stability.
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If on the other hand jk ∈ g, ik /∈ g we can argue similarly
∆uk(g, jk) ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆uk(g + ik, ik) > 0,
by SPC, and
∆uj(g, jk) ≥ 0⇒ ∆ui(g + ik, ik) ≥ 0,
by anonymous convexity. Again, i and k would want to add a link, so that g
cannot be stable.
Proof of Corollary 2. The idea is to find a threshold for which any terms of order
δ3 and higher can be disregarded.
Remember that
uBCi = bi(g)− ηi(g)c = e
′
i
[
∞∑
t=0
δtAt
]
~1− ηi(g)c,
A being the adjacency matrix of network g and ei the i-th unit vector, and thus
∆uBCi (g+ij, ij) = bi(g+ij)−bi(g)−c = δ+δ
2ηj(g+ij)+e
′
i
[
∞∑
t=3
δt(At+ij − A
t)
]
~1−c,
where A+ij is the adjacency matrix corresponding to the network g + ij.
Now, take some players i, j, k ∈ N and a network g such that ij ∈ g, ik /∈ g and
ηj(g) ≤ ηk(g). We can find a lower bound for marginal utility of adding k by
disregarding third order terms,
∆uBCi (g + ik, ik) ≥ δ + δ
2(ηk(g) + 1)− c,
and we can find an upper bound for the marginal utility of deleting j by consid-
ering utility of the complete network from order 3 on,19
∆uBCi (g, ij) ≤ δ + δ
2ηj(g) +
∞∑
t=3
δtηj(g)(n− 1)
t−2 − c
= δ + δ2ηj(g) + δ
2ηj(g)
∞∑
t=1
δt(n− 1)t − c
19Notice that the approximations used are quite rough. For example, instead of using the
empty network as a lower bound approximation, one could instead use the star network of
ηk(g) + 1 players.
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= δ + δ2ηj(g) + δ
2ηj(g)
(
∞∑
t=0
δt(n− 1)t − 1
)
− c
= δ + δ2ηj(g) + δ
2ηj(g)
(
1
1− δ(n− 1)
− 1
)
− c
= δ +
δ2ηj(g)
1− δ(n− 1)
− c.
With this we get
δ + δ2(ηk(g) + 1)− c ≥ δ +
δ2ηj(g)
1− δ(n− 1)
− c ∀ ηj(g) ≤ ηk(g)
⇔ ηk(g) + 1 ≥
ηj(g)
1− δ(n− 1)
∀ ηj(g) ≤ ηk(g)
⇔ 1− δ(n− 1) ≥
ηj(g)
ηk(g) + 1
∀ ηj(g) ≤ ηk(g)
Since ηk(g) ≤ n− 2, the right-hand side is maximized for ηj(g) = ηk(g) = n− 2.
Thus,
⇔ 1− δ(n− 1) ≥
n− 2
n− 1
⇔ δ ≤
1
(n− 1)2
.
Thus, for δ < 1
(n−1)2
it holds true that
ηj(g) ≤ ηk(g) ⇒ ∆u
BC
i (g, ij) < ∆u
BC
i (g + ik, ik). (6.5)
Let now i, j, k ∈ N such that ηj(g) ≤ ηk(g) and ∆u
BC
i (g, ij) ≥ 0. Then it directly
follows from (6.5) that
∆uBCi (g + ik, ik) > 0,
such that uBC satisfies strong preference for centrality.
Letting on the other hand ηi(g) ≤ ηj(g) and ∆u
BC
i (g, ik) ≥ 0, it is
0 ≤ ∆uBCi (g, ik)
= δ + δ2ηk(g) + e
′
i
[
∞∑
t=3
δt(At − At−ik)
]
~1− c
< δ + δ2ηk(g + jk) + e
′
j
[
∞∑
t=3
δt(At+jk − A
t)
]
~1− c
= ∆uBCj (g + jk, jk),
(6.6)
thus uBC also satisfies anonymous convexity.
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Proof of Lemma 2. Divide the set of players into two equal groups and label the
players in the groups as (i11, i
1
2, ..., i
1
n/2; i
2
1, i
2
2, ..., i
2
n/2). To construct a symmetric
regular network of degree 1 ≤ k ≤ n/2, connect each player ijm with players
(i3−jm , ..., i
3−j
m+k−1), where player i
j
p = i
j
p−n/2, so that for example i
1
n/2+1, i
1
1 are two
labels for the same player. It is clear that with this construction all players are
in symmetric positions.
Labeling the networks above as grk for 1 ≤ k ≤ n/2, a symmetric regular network
of degree n/2 + 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 2 can be constructed as grk = g
N − grn−k−1.
Finally, the empty and the complete network are trivially symmetric, what com-
pletes the argument.
Proof of Proposition 3. The empty network g∅ is either pairwise stable or not
addition proof. In the first case the result is already established, so suppose the
latter, that is (with homogeneity)
∆ui(g
∅ + ij, ij) > 0 ∀i, j ∈ N.
With strategic complements, also ∆ui(g
r
1, ij) > 0. Notice that g
r
1 is necessarily
a symmetric network, so that with anonymity it is ui(g
r
1) = uj(g
r
1) for any two
players i, j ∈ N and by the same argument ∆ui(g
r
1, ij) > 0 ∀ij ∈ g
r
1, making g
r
1
deletion proof.
Take now any symmetric regular network grk of degree 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 2 that is
deletion proof. It is either addition proof and hence pairwise stable or it holds
for some i, j ∈ N, ij /∈ grk that
∆ui(g
r
k + ij, ij) > 0,
and as the utility profile is degree-based and grk is symmetric also
∆ui(g
r
k + ij, ij) > 0 ∀ij ∈ g
N − grk.
With strategic complements it holds again that in this case also ∆ui(g
r
k+1, ij) >
0 ∀ij ∈ grk+1, for g
r
k+1 being again a symmetric regular network which exists
and can be reached by Lemma 2. Notice in particular that by assumption, as
the last link was added with positive marginal utility, all links of the player and
hence all links in the network are of positive marginal utility, as again the utility
profile is degree-based. So grk+1 is again deletion proof.
If k+ 1 = n/2 and grn/2 is not addition proof, change to g
N − grn/2−1 and proceed
as above. Observe that n/2 = (n− 1)− (n/2− 1) and thus gN − grn/2−1, so for a
degree-based utility profile it is u(grn/2) = u(g
N − grn/2−1), and thus the network
is again deletion proof.
The finiteness of the setting, and in particular the existence of a maximal degree
(n− 1) completes the argument and existence is established.
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Proposition 7.
Suppose the degree-based profile of utility functions satisfies strategic comple-
ments, weak preference for centrality and anonymity. If the number of players n
is odd, then there exists a restricted regular network that is pairwise stable.
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof is structurally the same as of Proposition 3.
Suppose in any restricted regular network g˜ = grrm , 1 ≤ m < n− 1 player i is the
isolated player, and suppose that g˜−i is a symmetric network. Observe that if the
empty network is not addition proof then an isolated player has strictly positive
marginal utility of any link in any network due to strategic complements.
Now, if g˜ is not addition proof, then either ∆uj(g˜+jk, jk) > 0 for all j, k ∈ N\{i}
or ∆uj(g˜+ ij, ij) > 0 and by WPC also ∆uj(g˜+ jk, jk) > 0 for all j, k ∈ N\{i}.
Hence we get to the network grrm+1, where again i is isolated and (g
rr
m+1)−i is
symmetric, by the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3.
Suppose finally that g˜ is such that g−i is complete. Note that ∆ui(g˜ + ij, ij) >
0 for all j 6= i, thus if ∆uj(g˜ + ij, ij) < 0 then g˜ is pairwise stable, but if
∆uj(g˜ + ij, ij) > 0 then link ij is formed.
Let now gˆ be such that gˆ = g˜ + li, where 1 ≤ |li| ≤ n− 2. Observe that gˆ ⊃ g
rr
|li|
.
As grr|li| was not pairwise stable, it is ∆ui(g
rr
|li|
+ ij, ij) > 0, ηj(g
rr
|li|
) 6= 0, and as
ηi(g
rr
|li|
) = |li| = ηi(gˆ) by strategic complements also ∆ui(gˆ + ij, ij) > 0 for all
j ∈ gN − gˆ and the complete network is pairwise stable.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose the complete network is not deletion proof, i.e.
it is not PS (otherwise there is nothing to show). Then by anonymity,
∆ui(g
N , ij) < 0 ∀i, j ∈ N
. Hence taking one player i ∈ N and deleting all her links yields by convexity
∆ui(g
N − Li(g
N) + ij, ij) ≤ ∆ui(g
N − ij + ij, ij) < 0 ∀i, j ∈ N
such that the network gN −Li(g
N) which is the dominant group network gdgn−1 is
addition proof.
Now let a dominant group network gdgm of size m be addition proof. If it is also
deletion proof then it is pairwise stable in which case there is nothing more to
show. Hence, suppose that gdgm is not deletion proof. Then, there exists a player
i ∈ N such that ∆ui(g
dg
m , ij) < 0.
Now, by convexity it is also ∆ui(g
dg
m − li(g
dg
m ) + ij, ij) < 0, where li(g
dg
m ) = {ik ∈
gdgm }. Observing that g
dg
m − li(g
dg
m ) = g
dg
m−1 we have by anonymity that no isolated
player i ∈ I(gdgm−1) wants to form a link to any player of the dominant group.
What is more, as ∅ = Nj ⊂ Nk for any j ∈ I(g
dg
m−1) and k ∈ C(g
dg
m−1), by
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WPC also isolated players do not want to form links in gdgm−1. Thus, g
dg
m−1 is
again addition proof. Hence if no network gdgm is PS then the empty network is
necessarily pairwise stable. By definition, the empty and the complete network
are dominant group networks, where the latter is addition proof (since there are
no more links that can be added). Thus, by induction either all dominant group
networks are addition proof in which case the empty network is PS (since there
are no more links that can be deleted) or there exists network of dominant group
structure which is deletion and addition proof, i.e. PS.
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